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Abstract 
Recent studies demonstrate a puzzling decline in relational 
reasoning during development. Specifically, 3-year-olds fail 
in a relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task, while younger 
children (18-30 months) succeed (Walker, Bridgers, & 
Gopnik, 2016). Hoyos, Shao, and Gentner (2016) propose that 
older children fail because of a bias toward individual object 
properties induced by “avid noun learning.” If this is the case, 
children learning a language with a stronger emphasis on 
verbs, like Mandarin Chinese, may show an attenuated 
decline in relational reasoning. We first test this possibility by 
reproducing the causal RMTS task in China, and find that 
Mandarin-speaking 3-year-olds outperform their English-
speaking peers in the U.S. In a second experiment, we show 
that Mandarin speakers exhibit a corresponding bias toward 
relational solutions while English speakers prefer object-
based solutions in an ambiguous context. We discuss possible 
mechanisms through which language and culture may 
promote (or hinder) the early development of relational 
reasoning. 
Keywords: cognitive development, causal learning, relational 
reasoning, overhypotheses, language, culture. 
The puzzling decline of relational reasoning 
Relational reasoning is often cited as a defining feature of 
human cognition (e.g., Gentner, 2003), and a source of the 
differences between the abilities of humans and other 
primates (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008). The ability to 
recognize relational similarities appears surprisingly early in 
human development: 7- and 9-month-old infants distinguish 
the abstract relations “same” and “different,” looking longer 
at novel pairs of objects that differ from a habituated 
relation (Ferry, Hespos, & Gentner, 2015; Tyrrell, Stauffer, 
& Snowman, 1991).  
Toddlers (18-30 months) can also employ these concepts 
to infer abstract causal properties in a relational match-to-
sample task (Walker & Gopnik, 2014). In this task, children 
observe as four pairs of blocks are placed on a toy that plays 
music when “activated.” Two of the pairs contain identical 
blocks (“same”) and the other two pairs contain mismatched 
blocks (“different”). For toddlers in the same condition, the 
toy activates and plays music only when the “same” pairs 
are placed on top, while those in the different condition 
observe the opposite pattern. When shown novel pairs of 
“same” or “different” blocks and asked to choose which pair 
would activate the toy, toddlers succeed in picking the pair 
that is relationally consistent with their training.  
However, this early success in relational reasoning is 
quickly followed by a puzzling decline: 3-year-olds (36-48 
months) fail to select the relational solution in precisely the 
same task (Walker, Bridgers, & Gopnik, 2016). Similar 
difficulties have also been observed in a variety of relational 
reasoning tasks (e.g., Christie & Gentner, 2007; 2010; 2014; 
Gentner, 1988; 2010; Hoyos, Shao, & Gentner, 2016). By 4 
years of age (52-60 months), children once again succeed in 
a standard RMTS task (Christie & Gentner, 2014), but 
continue to neglect relational similarities in other contexts 
even at 5-6 years of age (e.g., Gentner, 1988). This pattern 
of early success, decline, and reemergence suggests that the 
development of relational reasoning may follow a U-shaped 
trajectory, rather than a continuous process of gradual 
improvement, as previously suggested (e.g., Gentner & 
Medina, 1998). What causes this curious dip in children’s 
relational reasoning?  
One possibility is that preschoolers retain an early 
competence to reason about relations, but that this 
competence is overshadowed by a failure to attend to 
relational structure. In particular, Walker et al. (2016) 
suggest that 3-year-olds neglect relational information as a 
result of a learned bias to attend to individual object kinds 
and their properties. This claim is consistent with a large 
literature demonstrating that preschool-aged children attend 
to objects and attributes, and proposals that children must 
overcome an “entity-based view” in order to effectively 
process relations (Christie & Gentner, 2010; also, e.g., 
Christie & Gentner, 2007; 2014; Gentner, 1988; Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991; Hall & Waxman, 1993). 
Several proposals link this well-documented object bias to 
language development, which has been shown to both foster 
and impair relational reasoning (e.g., Christie & Gentner, 
2014; Hoyos, Shao, & Gentner, 2016). These seemingly 
incongruous findings have led some to regard the 
contradictory effects of language on relational thinking as a 
developmental paradox (Hoyos, Shao, & Gentner, 2016).  
Noun learning and relational development 
In a recent paper, Hoyos, Shao, and Gentner (2016) suggest 
that the decline of relational reasoning may stem from an 
object bias induced by language learning. They reason that 
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 “avid noun-learning” in early childhood likely leads to a 
“captivation with objects,” which in turn helps children to 
learn additional nouns. In support of this view, they provide 
evidence that an experimentally induced noun bias interferes 
with relational reasoning. In this experiment, they replicate 
a previously published finding (Christie & Gentner, 2014) 
that 4-year-olds succeed on a standard RMTS task in a 
baseline condition, but show that priming nouns in a 
picture-labeling activity significantly reduces subsequent 
RMTS performance. On its own, this outcome suggests that 
language learning—and an emphasis on nouns in 
particular—may negatively impact relational reasoning in 
toddlers.  
However, earlier work by Christie and Gentner (2014) 
leads to the opposite conclusion, that linguistic concepts—
and nouns in particular—facilitate relational reasoning in 
the standard RMTS task. They find that providing children 
with a novel noun (“truffet”) for pairs of objects improves 
toddlers’ subsequent RMTS performance. Here, and 
elsewhere, the authors argue that young children do not 
initially have access to a hypothesis space that is “sufficient 
to allow for the range of possible semantic categories” but 
instead form hypotheses about relational meanings by 
comparing co-labeled items to identify common structure 
(Christie & Gentner, 2010).  
Taken together, this account and the conflicting findings 
create an apparent paradox, in which a linguistic emphasis 
on nouns orients young learners away from relations, but 
language simultaneously provides the necessary scaffolding 
for relational learning by highlighting relational structure. In 
this way, language learning appears to solve the very 
problem it creates. Accordingly, this account implies that 
language learning may be interpreted as a double-edged 
sword, drawing attention to objects at the expense of 
relations, but in doing so, ultimately helping children to 
construct novel relational categories. 
Language as a driver of children’s hypotheses 
The current research further explores the hypothesis that 
language learning influences the types of concepts and 
categories that young children entertain. Under the paradox 
account presented above, language learning helps children 
develop new relational categories to further populate their 
hypothesis space. An alternative possibility is that children 
have access to both relational and object-based hypotheses 
throughout development, but that the probabilities assigned 
to each type of hypothesis change as a result of prior 
knowledge and past experience, including language 
learning. This account draws on probabilistic models of 
cognitive development in which children are seen as 
Bayesian learners (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 2012), who 
weight the likelihood of a given hypothesis (the probability 
of the data given the hypothesis) by its prior probability (the 
general probability of the hypothesis, before any data are 
observed). Consequently, if a hypothesis has high prior 
probability, it will require stronger data to overturn it. This 
reasoning may also be applied to entire categories of 
hypotheses in the form of an overhypothesis, a general 
principle by which the learner assigns higher prior 
probability to particular types of hypotheses (Kemp, 
Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007). From this perspective, the 
“noun explosion” in early language learning could motivate 
an object bias—and temporary dip in relational reasoning—
in the form of an overhypothesis that privileges object-based 
hypotheses over relational ones (for a discussion of 
language-induced overhypotheses and their relevance 
beyond language, see Colunga & Smith, 2005). By this 
account, language acts as one of many possible influences 
that affect a learner’s hypothesis space, not by providing for 
new hypotheses (as the paradox view suggests), but by 
adjusting children’s existing prior expectations.  
Despite this distinction, both of these accounts leave room 
for an important role of language in driving children’s 
relational reasoning, and both predict that a noun focus in 
word learning would (at least initially) bias children toward 
object properties and away from relations.  
Previous demonstrations (e.g., Christie & Gentner, 2010; 
Hoyos, Shao, & Gentner, 2016) have tested this hypothesis 
indirectly, showing that immediate exposure to nouns 
modulates success on RMTS tasks, presumably by directing 
the learner’s attention toward or away from relational 
information. However, these findings (which may reflect 
simple priming effects) do not necessarily demonstrate a 
relationship between noun focus in word learning and 
RMTS performance, as the experimental groups all involve 
English speakers, without any systematic between-group 
differences in degree of noun focus.  
Conveniently, not all word learning follows the same 
trajectory. In particular, the “noun explosion” that has been 
documented in English-language learners is not universal 
across languages. In Korean, for instance, there is evidence 
for a comparable “verb spurt” (Choi & Gopnik, 1995). 
Similarly, several studies have found that children learning 
Mandarin Chinese produce more verbs than nouns in their 
spontaneous speech (both types and tokens), in contrast with 
English speakers of the same age, who produce a greater 
proportion of nouns than verbs (Tardif, 1996; Tardif, Shatz, 
& Naigles, 1997).  
If an emphasis on noun learning (relative to other parts of 
speech) indeed drives the dip in relational reasoning by 
fostering an object bias, then children learning a more verb-
centric language should show an attenuated or reversed bias. 
While nouns may direct focus to object properties by relying 
on these in picking out meanings, verbs often signal 
relational meanings across multiple entities, and might serve 
to redirect attention accordingly.  
The difference in noun focus between English and 
Mandarin Chinese therefore presents two natural conditions 
in word learning, which we exploit as a test of the proposal 
that properties emphasized in word learning induce a bias in 
reasoning more generally.  
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 Experiment 1: Causal relational reasoning in 
Mandarin-speaking children 
To test for a relationship between noun focus in word 
learning and relational reasoning, we first reproduced 
Walker et al.’s (2016) causal RMTS task (see Figure 1) with 
Mandarin-speaking children (36-48 months) in China.  
 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 64 Mandarin-speaking 36-48-
month-olds (M = 42.1 months; 28 female) took part in 
Experiment 1. This sample size was chosen based on 
previously published studies using the same paradigm. 
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to either the 
same or different condition. Five additional participants 
were excluded due to experimenter error or failure to 
complete the study. All participants were native speakers of 
Mandarin Chinese, and were recruited and tested at 
preschools in China.  
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure 
replicated those used in Experiment 1 of Walker et al. 
(2016), with the exception that instructions were given in 
Mandarin Chinese. The original English instructions 
(described here in English) were independently translated 
and backtranslated to ensure accuracy.  
 Children were tested individually, seated at a table across 
from the experimenter. The causal RMTS task began after a 
brief warmup to familiarize the child with the experimenter. 
During the task, the experimenter placed matching and 
mismatched pairs of painted wooden blocks on top of a box 
which appeared to play music in response to certain blocks. 
In reality, the experimenter activated a wireless doorbell 
inside the box by surreptitiously pushing a button.  
The experimenter began by placing an opaque cardboard 
box on the table, saying “This is my toy! Sometimes it plays 
music when I put blocks on top and other times it does not. 
Should we try some and see how it works?” The 
experimenter then produced two blocks, said “Let’s try!” 
and put both blocks on top of the toy simultaneously. The 
toy played music and the experimenter said “Music! My toy 
played music!” The experimenter picked up the blocks and 
set them back on the toy, which again played music, saying 
“Music! These ones made my toy play music!” She then 
repeated this procedure with a new pair of blocks in the 
opposite relation. The new pair did not make the toy play 
music, and the experimenter responded to the first try with 
“No music! Do you hear anything? I don’t hear anything,” 
and after the second try, said “No music. These ones did not 
make my toy play music.” This pattern was repeated with 
two additional pairs of blocks. The experimenter always 
began with a causal pair (identical blocks in the same 
condition and blocks of differing colors and shapes in the 
different condition), and alternated inert, causal, inert, using 
novel blocks in each new pair, and randomizing the specific 
blocks between participants.  
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of training and test trials in 
Experiment 1. Reprinted from Walker et al. (2016). 
 
After the four training trials, the experimenter said “Now 
that you’ve seen how my toy works, I need your help 
finding the things that will make it play music. I have two 
choices for you.” The experimenter presented the child with 
two new pairs made of novel blocks, one “same” pair and 
one “different.” Each pair was supported by a tray, which 
the experimenter held up as she said “I have these…and I 
have these. Only one of these trays has things that will make 
my toy play music. Can you point to the tray that has the 
things that will make it play?” They trays were placed on 
either side of the toy, just out of reach of the child, with the 
side of the correct pair and order of presentation 
counterbalanced between participants. The experimenter 
recorded the child’s first point or reach, and scored the 
answer as correct if the child chose the test pair (same or 
different) that corresponded to her training.  
Results and discussion 
Mandarin-speaking preschoolers selected the test pair that 
was consistent with their training in both same (69%; one-
tailed binomial p = .025) and different (72%; one-tailed 
binomial p = .010) conditions (see Figure 2).1  
                                                
1 One-tailed binomial tests reflect the directional nature of our 
hypothesis, but the outcome is comparable with two-tailed tests 
(same: p = .052; different: p = .020).  
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Figure 2: Proportion of correct relational matches selected 
by English- and Mandarin-speaking toddlers. English 
speaker data is reproduced from Experiment 1 of Walker et 
al. (2016). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
As predicted, Mandarin-speaking preschoolers succeed in 
the RMTS task at an age at which their English-speaking 
counterparts fail (English speakers in the Walker et al. study 
performed at chance in both same (46%) and different 
(43%) conditions).2 Although this outcome is consistent 
with an account in which verb-focused word learning biases 
children toward relational solutions, it is also possible that 
Mandarin speakers succeed at the task for more general 
reasons (attention, etc.), without having a relational bias.  
We can discriminate these two possibilities by examining 
bias in an ambiguous task, with both relational and object 
matches available, and no definitive correct answer. If 
Mandarin-speaking toddlers succeeded in Experiment 1 
because of a general aptitude for test-taking, and not a 
specific bias toward relations, then they should respond at 
chance in a modified RMTS with no correct answer. 
Additionally, if an object bias is responsible for the poor 
performance of English speakers (and not just random 
responding), then we should observe systematic preferences 
for object matches when there is no conflicting evidence for 
relations. In Experiment 2, we assess these possibilities.  
Experiment 2: Comparing relational and 
object focus across cultures 
Experiment 2 tests for baseline differences in bias toward 
relational or object-based hypotheses across Mandarin and 
English speakers. To do this, we created an ambiguous 
paradigm, in which it is unclear whether a particular object 
or the relationship between objects is causal. Specifically, 
                                                
2 We compared performance of Mandarin-speaking preschoolers in 
the current study with English-speaking preschoolers in Walker et 
al. (2016). Considering each condition separately, we find a 
significant difference between Mandarin- and English-speaking 
preschoolers in the different condition (one-tailed p = .022, 
Fisher’s exact) and a marginal difference in the same condition 
(one-tailed p =  .068, Fisher’s exact). Combining across different 
and same conditions, we find that Mandarin-speaking preschoolers 
significantly outperform English speakers (one-tailed p = .004, 
Fisher’s exact). 
we presented children with a “different is causal” condition, 
in which the same object appears in each of the causal pairs 
(see Figure 3). In this case, it is perfectly reasonable to infer 
that either the individual object (i.e., the blue square) or the 
relation (i.e., different) produced the effect. We pit these 
options against each other by presenting the same objects in 
the test pairs. The individual objects come together to create 
a “same” pair—which is correct with respect to the object 
hypothesis, but incorrect with respect to the relational 
hypothesis, and the other objects associated with the effect 
come together to create a “different” pair—which is correct 
with respect to the relational hypothesis and incorrect with 
respect to the individual object hypothesis.  
If a focus on verbs in early language learning induces a 
bias toward relational hypotheses, we should observe a 
tendency toward relational solutions in Mandarin-speaking 
toddlers, and a converse bias toward objects in noun-
focused English-speaking toddlers.  
 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 112 3-year-olds participated in 
Experiment 2, 56 native Mandarin speakers (M = 41.4 
months; 28 female) and 56 native English speakers (M = 
41.4 months; 21 female). An additional 11 children were 
tested but excluded as a result of experimenter error or 
failure to complete the study. Mandarin-speaking children 
were recruited and tested at preschools in China, and 
English speakers at preschools and museums in the U.S. In 
all settings, children were tested individually with the 
experimenter in a private room. 
Materials and procedure. Materials were identical to those 
in Experiment 1, and the procedure closely resembled that 
of the “different” condition, but with several modifications 
to create an ambiguous causal structure (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic illustration of ambiguous training and 
test trials in Experiment 2, in which the evidence was 
consistent with both object and relational solutions. 
  
     First, one of the blocks (represented by the blue square in 
Figure 3) appears in both different pairs. This reoccurring 
block provides the object-based hypothesis (i.e., the blue 
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 square is causal). Second, the test trial included two pairs 
composed of blocks that were previously observed in the 
“different” training pairs. Finally, due to the constraints of 
the study design, it was not possible to present an 
ambiguous same condition. As a result, Experiment 2 only 
included the different condition. As in the previous study, 
the experimenter asked the child to choose the pair that 
would activate the machine. The child’s first point or reach 
was scored as consistent with either an object selection or a 
relational selection. 
 
Results and discussion 
Given an ambiguous choice between object and relational 
matches, English-speaking preschoolers selected the object 
match (64%; two-tailed binomial p = .044) and Mandarin-
speaking preschoolers chose the relational match (66%; 
two-tailed binomial p = .022; see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of object and relational matches 
selected by English- and Mandarin-speaking toddlers in 
Experiment 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
General discussion 
In two experiments, we find that Mandarin-speaking 
children tend to privilege relations whereas English-
speaking children tend to privilege individual objects, often 
missing the abstract relation. 
In Experiment 1, we evaluated whether the noun focus in 
English word learning can account for the dip in relational 
reasoning observed in English-speaking preschoolers. To do 
so, we examined relational reasoning in Mandarin-speaking 
preschoolers, whose early language learning is more 
focused on verbs. Consistent with the noun-focus account, 
we found that Mandarin-speaking preschoolers substantially 
outperform their English-speaking peers in identifying 
shared relational structure in the RMTS.  
In Experiment 2, we tested for the key factor predicted to 
mediate the relationship between language and RMTS 
performance. This study explored whether English- and 
Mandarin-speaking preschoolers exhibit differing biases 
toward relational and object-based solutions. Indeed, we 
found that in an ambiguous context with no correct answer, 
Mandarin speakers tend to favor solutions consistent with 
relational hypotheses and English speakers show a 
contrasting object bias.  
It is important to note that while English-speaking 
preschoolers have often exhibited poor performance in 
relational tasks of the same format, their consistent selection 
of object-based matches in this experiment is not trivial. 
Choosing the object match may indeed present a more 
challenging cognitive task. In order to select the object 
match at test, children must track and remember the relevant 
object (the blue square) throughout the training trials, which 
(perhaps counterintuitively) increases the cognitive load 
compared with learning the abstract relation, which does not 
require tracking of any particular objects. Accordingly, this 
outcome demonstrates a surprising competence on the part 
of English-speaking preschoolers, which may also be 
attributable to their noun-centric language learning.  
Taken together, these findings inform potential sources of 
bias in early learning and the development of relational 
reasoning. In particular, they rule out the possibility that 
language learning in general produces an object bias. 
Instead, we show that preschoolers of the same age in 
different linguistic and cultural contexts may have varying 
degrees of relational and object focus, and that these 
differences correlate with robust population-level 
differences in relational reasoning.  
Our findings stand in contrast to the suggestion that 
language plays a paradoxical role in relational development, 
by both hindering relational reasoning and facilitating it 
(Hoyos et al., 2016). Although this may be true in noun-
focused languages, like English, it does not appear to be a 
general feature of language learning.  
Furthermore, we suggest that language may well act to 
hinder and facilitate relational reasoning, without the need 
to view this phenomenon as a paradox. Instead, it is possible 
that the object bias and the associated dip in relational 
reasoning observed in English speakers result from general 
learning processes with no exceptional role for language. 
Instead, the structures and features of language may be 
interpreted as some of many sources of input informing the 
types of concepts that are privileged during early learning.  
Of course, several questions remain regarding the source 
of the population differences observed here. For example, it 
is certainly possible that cultural factors (other than 
language) play a role in facilitating a relational focus in 
Mandarin speakers. Indeed, there are well-documented 
differences between collectivist and individualist cultures, 
which may similarly result in an emphasis on relationships 
between entities or on characteristics of individual entity 
kinds (e.g., Chiu, 1972; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Oyserman & 
Lee, 2008; Peng & Knowles, 2003). Our ongoing research is 
aimed at further pulling these hypotheses apart.  
That said, regardless of whether language, culture, or 
some combination of the two is ultimately responsible for 
these effects, the current findings demonstrate that 
preschoolers have the capacity to infer relational properties, 
providing additional evidence that the object bias is learned 
after early competence in relational reasoning is achieved 
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 (Walker et al., 2016). More broadly, we have established 
population-level differences in relational focus that occur 
naturally across cultures early in development and predict 
the developmental trajectory of relational reasoning.   
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